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mined that the balancing test was in-
tended to apply to both infamous crimes 
and crimes affecting witness credibil-
ity. Id at 271,619 A.2dat 109. Sec-
ond, the court considered the legislative 
history underlying the adoption of the 
rule to determine the drafters' intent. It 
found that the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure sought 
to replace the old, dangerously rigid 
rule, by establishing a "broadly-ap-
plied" balancing test to limit the admis-
sibility of all prior convictions. Id 
Next, the court acknowledged the 
differences between the new Maryland 
rule and the federal rule on impeach-
ment by prior conviction. The court 
noted that the federal rule provides for 
automatic admission of crimes of dis-
honesty or falsehood and is, therefore, 
quite inflexible. Id at273,619A.2dat 
110 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2». 
Alternatively, the Maryland rule re-
quires a preliminary balancing test for 
all prior conviction evidence. The court 
concluded that requiring the trial court 
to use the balancing test for both types 
of prior convictions is more consistent 
with the State of Maryland's policy of 
permitting courts to regulate the admis-
sibility of all evidence. Beales, 329 
Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110. 
In applying its interpretation of Rule 
1-502 to the facts before it, the court of 
appeals recognized the strong presump-
tion in favor of upholding the trial court's 
decision. Nevertheless, after reviewing 
the record as a whole, the court decided 
that the trial judge had failed to ad-
equately weigh the probative value 
against the risk of unfair prejudice in 
admitting the evidence of Lawrence's 
prior conviction for theft, as required 
by Rule 1-502. Id at 274, 619 A.2d at 
110. The trial judge had demonstrated 
his unawareness of the new rule by 
alluding to the prosecutor's "right" to 
impeach by prior conviction and by 
failing to inquire about the date of the 
theft conviction. Id 
Finally, the court of appeals found 
that thetrialjudge's error was not harm-
less. It held that because of the factual 
nature of the arguments from both par-
ties, thejury's verdict depended prima-
rily on its perception of the witnesses' 
credibility. Id at 275, 619 A.2d at Ill. 
Furthermore, it noted that due to the 
difficulty in determining credibility, 
harmless error analysis would require 
the court to speculate as to what weight 
the jury assigned to Lawrence's testi-
mony. The court, therefore, could not 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
trial judge's error was harm1ess. Ac-
cordingly, it remanded the case to the 
circuit court for a new trial. 
Beales v. State represents the first 
attempt by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland to interpret the new Mary-
land Rule 1-502 governing impeach-
ment of witnesses by prior conviction. 
As interpreted, Rule 1-502 gives the 
trial court considerably broader discre-
tion in ruling on the admission of this 
type of impeachment evidence. Be-
calise the trial judge hears all the testi-
mony and experiences witness demeanor 
first hand, this discretion will probably 
lead to more equitable results. More-
over, although a bright-line rule may 
provide notice as to the admissibility of 
prior convictions for impeachment of 
witnesses, this rule will give opponents 
of the impeachment evidence greater 
capacity to argue against its admissibil-
ity. As a result of this decision, Rule 1-
502 will lead to increasing amounts of 
testimony and greater weight given to 
the testimony of witnesses or parties 
with prior criminal convictions. 
-Kelly A. Casper 
Rosenberg v. Helinski: A WITNESS 
MAY REITERATE THE SUB-
STANCE OF HIS TESTIMONY TO 
JOURNALISTS OUTSIDE A 
COURTROOM, AND HIS RE-
MARKS REMAIN LEGALLY 
PRIVILEGED. 
In Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 
664, 616A.2d 866 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland addressed a case 
of first impression regarding the issue 
of whether remarks made to reporters 
outside a courtroom by a witness are 
privileged. The court held that the 
psychologist's remarks concerning his 
expert testimony at a child abuse hear-
ing, even though defamatory to the 
father's personal reputation, are abso-
lutely privileged, and the psychologist 
is protected from liability. 
The instant case arose out of a di-
vorce hearing before the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore County wherin Mr. 
Helinski requested unsupervised visita-
tion with his two-year old daughter. 
Mrs. Helinski opposed his request; al-
leging that Mr. Helinski had sexually 
abused the child. As evidence of the 
abuse, Mrs. Helinski offered the expert 
testimony of a pediatrician at 
Baltimore's Mercy Hospital, who testi-
fied that the child had a well-healed scar 
which was diagnostic of a sexual abuse 
injury. Holding that there was no con-
nection linking the child's injury to Mr. 
Helinski, the trial court granted the 
divorce, and allowed Mr. Helinski 
unsupervised visitation with his daugh-
ter. 
Despite the court's ruling, Mrs. 
Helinski denied visitation of the child to 
Mr. Helinski, and the couple appeared 
again in a hearing before the Circujt 
Court for Baltimore County. At this 
hearing, Mrs. Helinski offered the testi-
mony of Leon Rosenberg, Ph.D., a child 
psychologist and associate professor of 
medical psychology and pediatrics at 
Johns Hopkins University School of 
Medicine. Dr. Rosenberg'S testimony 
was offered to prove that the abuse had 
occurred, and as a result, Mr. Helinski 
should not have unsupervised visitation 
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of the child. 
Dr. Rosenberg testified that he had 
evaluated the child three times, and 
included in his evaluation the report of 
the pediatrician who had initially exam-
ined the child, as well as that of a Child 
Protective Services social worker who 
had interviewed the child. The basis of 
his testimony was that the child ex-
pressed fear of her father because he 
had hurt her in the genital area and was 
afraid of being hu rt there again, and that 
Rosenberg believed the child was "hon-
est and spontaneous" and not coached. 
At the end of the hearing, Dr. 
Rosenberg was confronted on the court-
house steps by a television camera crew 
and a Baltimore station WJZ 
newswoman who asked him questions 
regarding the case. The only record of 
the conversation was the two minute 
and fifteen second story which aired 
that evening on the six 0' clock local 
ncws. ll1estory "identified the Helinskis 
by name," incorporated artist's court-
room sketches of Rosenberg and the 
parties, as well as stated the allegations 
made by Mrs. Helinski that were ulti-
mately confinned by Dr. Rosenberg in 
his on-camera il)terview. The story also 
contained three statements of Dr. 
Rosenberg wherein he reaffinned his 
testimony regarding his evaluation of 
the child's injury. 
As a result of the newscast, Mr. 
Helinski brought a defamation action 
against Dr. Rosenberg in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City. Dr. 
Rosenberg subsequently filed a motion 
for summary judgment. The court, 
granting Dr. Rosenberg's motion, held 
that "Rosenberg's comments were pro-
tected by the privilege given to those 
who recount in-court testimony." Mr. 
Helinski appealed, and the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed 
and remanded the case to the circuit 
court. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land subsequently granted Dr. 
Rosenberg's petition for certiorari, and 
reversed the decision of the court of 
special appeals. 
First, the court of appeals held that 
in order to recover for defan1ation, the 
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plaintiff must establish that the defen-
dant made the defamatory. statement, 
which was false, to a third person, that 
the defendant was legally at fault, and 
that the plaintiff suffered harm. 
Rosenberg v. Helinski. 328 Md. 664, 
675,616 A.2d 866,871 (1992) (citing 
Hearst Corporation v. Hughes. 297 
Md. 112, 120-125, 466 A.2d 486, 
(1983». The court found that Dr. 
Rosenberg's statements to the reporters 
were defamatory, as they tended "to 
expose [Mr. Helinski] to public scorn, 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby 
discouraging others ... from having a 
good opinion ... of [him]." Rosenberg. 
328 Md. at675, 616 A.2dat872 (quot-
ing Batson v. Sh~flett, 325 Md. 684, 
722-23, 602 A.2d 1191 (1992». The 
cou rt of appeals held, however, that the 
general rule in Maryland is that "state-
ments made by a witness during the 
course of judicial proceedings are ab-
solutely privileged, and ... cannot serve 
as the basis for an action in dcfama-
tion." Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 676,616 
A.2d at 872 (citing Odyniec v. 
Schneider. 322 Md. 520,526,588 A.2d 
786 (1991». Moreover, the witness is 
protected by this absolute privilege even 
if the statement was false, the motive 
malicious, or unreasonable. Rosenberg. 
328 Md. at 676, 616 A.2d at 872 (quot-
ing Odyniec v. Schneider. 322 Md. at 
527, 588 A.2d 786). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
examined the reasons for this absolute 
privilege from liability, and found that 
the "need for witnesses to speak freely 
in court, without intimidation by the 
possibility of civil liability" outweighed 
a person's right to bring a defamation 
action against the witness for state-
ments made by the same witness while 
testifying. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 677, 
616 A.2d at 872, (quoting Odyniec v. 
Schneider. 322 Md. at 528, 588 A.2d 
786». 
The court also address~d the lesser, 
conditional privilege given to people 
who report "in-court proceedings con-
taining defamatory material" if the re-
ports are "fair and substantially correct 
or substantially accurate accounts of 
what took place." Rosenberg. 328 
Md. at 677,616 A.2d at 872 (quoting 
McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 417, 426 
(1878». The privilege from liability, 
however, is conditional upon the report 
being found fair and substantially cor-
rect. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 678, 616 
A.2d at 873 (citing Brush-Moore 
Newsp. v. Pollitt. 220 Md. 132,138, 
151 A.2d 530 (1959». The court of 
appeals applied the conditional privi-
lege to Dr. Rosenberg'$ statements to 
the news media, and found that Dr. 
Rosenberg had acted as an agent, and 
"recounted events at ajudicial hearing 
[which was] entirely open to the pub-
lic." Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 680,616 
A.2dat 873-74. The court held that Dr. 
Rosenberg could invoke this conditional 
privilege, due to the fact that journalists 
as well as non-journalists are treated 
the same under the Constitution with 
respect to potential liability for defama-
tion when exercising their First Amend-
ment right of free speech. Id. at 680, 
616 A.2d at 874 (quoting Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers. 472U.S. 749, 773 (1985) (White,J., 
concurring) (First Amendment gives no 
more protection to the press that it does 
to others exercising their freedom of 
speech». 
In concluding the aforementioned, 
the court recognized that this case can1e 
down to whether Dr. Rosenberg's state-
ments to the news media were fair and 
accurate. Finding that Dr. Rosenberg's 
statements were virtually identical to 
his prior testimony and the fact he re-
ported to the media about his testimony 
and the "most significant substance of 
the hearing" lead the court to conclude 
that the statements were accurate and 
fair. Rosenberg. 328 Md. at 681-82, 
616 A.2d at 874-75. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
however, added a caveat to the "fair 
reporting privilege." The person mak-
ing the statement "cannot confer this 
privilege upon himself by making the 
original defamatory [statement], and 
then reporting to other people what he 
hadstated." Id. at684,616A.2dat876 
(quoting Restatement (Second) ofTorts 
§ 611, cmt. c). The court found that this 
caveat did not apply to Dr. Rosenberg 
because there was nothing in the record 
to suggest that he intended in bad faith 
to harm Mr. Helinski by his testimony 
or the statements made to the news 
media. Dr. Rosenberg testified as an 
expert witness and his statements to the 
news media ~'accurately and fairly re-
counted the substance of his testi-
mony." Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 
686, 616 A.2d at 877. 
Rosenberg v. Helinski is significant 
because the Court of Appeals of Mary -
land addressed an issue which is certain 
to arise again; the right of the public to 
reports of judicial proceedings, and the 
legal privilege extended to those who 
make fair and accurate reports. 
-Bonnie S. Laakso 
Dawson v. State: ENFORCEMENT 
OF STATE'S DRUG-FREE 
SCHOOL ZONE ST ATUJE DUR-
ING NON-SCHOOL HOURS 
HELD CONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Dawson v. State, 329 Md. 275, 
619 A.2d 111 (1993), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland upheld the consti-
tutionalityofthestate'sdrug-freeschool 
zone statute, which prohibits the distri-
bution of controlled dangerous sub-
stances within 1,000 feet ofa school's 
perimeter. After reviewing whether the 
statute's objective of protecting chil-
dren from the dangers ofthe drug trade 
is constitutionally achieved by the 
statute's broad imposition of criminal 
liability on offenders during non-school 
hours, the court found that the statute 
does not offend the due process require-
ments of either the United States Con-
stitution or the Maryland Constitution. 
During the course of an undercover 
drug operation in Harford County, 
county deputies purchased a quarter-
gram of cocaine from Stacey Eugene 
Dawson ("Dawson"). The transaction 
occurred within 1,000 feet of Halls 
Cross Elementary School, at approxi-
mately 9:30 p.m. After the sale, a 
uniformed officer returned to the scene 
and arrested Dawson. 
Dawson was indicted by the Grand 
Jury for Harford County for unlawful 
distribution of a controlled dangerous 
substance, under Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, § 286(a)(1)(1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), 
and for unlawful distribution of a con-
trolled dangerous substance within 
1,000 feet of school property, under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 286D ("§ 
286D"). A jury in the Circuit Court for . 
Harford County found Dawson guilty 
on both counts. Dawson appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land, but prior to its review of the case, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari. 
After first rejecting Dawson's con-
tention that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to convict him, the court focused 
on Dawson's argument that § 286D, 
Maryland's drug-free school zone stat-
ute, violated the equal protection clauses 
of both the United States Constitution 
and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Dawson argued that the statute's objec-
tive of protecting children from expo-
sure to drug activities was not served by 
its imposition of criminal liability dur-
ing non-school hours. The court ex-
plained that Dawson was alleging a 
"direct" substantive due process chal-
lenge by claiming that the statute was 
not reasonably related to the goal it 
intended to serve and that in the face of 
such a claim, a determination must be 
made whether the statute ". bears a real 
and substantial relation to the public 
health, morals, safety, and welfare of 
the citizens of this state. '" Dawson, 
329Md. at283, 619 A.2dat 115 (quot-
ing Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 
Md. 230, 236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 
(1975». If this test is satisfied, the 
statute will be upheld. 
In applying this test to § 286D, the 
court first examined the statutory lan-
guage and found that the statute was 
aimed at decreasing schoolchildren's 
drug use and enriching their educa-
tional environment by creating a drug-
free school zone. Dawson, 329 Md. at 
285,619 A.2d at 116. In addition, the 
court determined that the statute sought 
to limit schoolchildren's exposure to 
the negative environment and crime 
associated with the drug trade by shield-
ing them from such activity. Id. In light 
of these purposes, the court rejected 
Dawson's substantive due process chal-
lenge and found that a twenty-four hour 
prohibition against drug activity in 
school zones was a legitimate method of 
accomplishing the statute's purposes. 
Id. 
The court next considered Dawson's 
argument that the drug-free school zone 
statute was overbroad due to its impo-
sition of criminal liability during non-
school hours. Dawson, 329 Md. at286, 
619 A.2d at 116. The court, however, 
rejected Dawson's characterization of 
both school ground activities and the 
drug market, and found that the pres-
ence of children in school areas is not 
predictable, particularly in light of the 
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